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Broken Windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from un-
disputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. In a series of lab 
experiments we put one component of the theory to the test. We show that first impressions are 
causal for cooperativeness in three different institutional environments: absent targeted sanc-
tions; with decentralised punishment; with decentralised punishment qualified by the risk of 
counterpunishment. In all environments, the effect of first impressions cannot be explained with, 
but adds to, participants’ initial level of benevolence. Mere impression management is not strong 
enough to stabilise cooperation though. It must be combined with some risk of sanctions. 
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1. Motivation 
Times Square, Manhattan, 1990: clearly not the place to be. You would have met all sorts of out-
casts and would have exposed yourself to a serious risk of violent crime. Times Square, Manhat-
tan, 2000: indulge in the world’s most vibrant city, at its best. Don’t be afraid of violence. The 
crime rate is substantially below the national average.
1 Usually Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and 
New York Police Dept. Commissioner William Bratton are credited with the success (Zimring 
2007). In recent years, William Bratton has repeated the New York success in Los Angeles (Wa-
gers 2008). In both cities, he explicitly relied on the “broken windows” policy (Wilson and Kel-
ling 1982; Skogan 1990; Kelling and Coles 1996; Sousa and Kelling 2006).  
The approach was inspired by an experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo in 1969. Zimbardo 
simultaneously placed two otherwise identical cars in public spaces, one in the Bronx, the other 
in Palo Alto. Neither car had license plates, and the hood was open. Within 26 hours the first car 
was totally pillaged and destroyed, while the second stayed pristine for an entire week. Once the 
experimenters themselves broke a window with a hammer, it went to ruins within hours, even in 
the sheltered and prosperous Californian town (Zimbardo 1969).  
Correlation analysis supports the claim that the broken windows policy, measured by the number 
of traffic tickets (Wilson and Boland 1978), the number of arrests per police officer for disorder-
ly conduct or driving under influence (Sampson and Cohen 1988) or the number of misdemean-
our arrests (Kelling and Sousa 2001; Corman and Mocan 2005), contributed to the decline in 
serious crimes, even if one controls for economic conditions and for crime deterrence (Corman 
and Mocan 2005) (see also Cruz Melendez 2006: for the link to the “Moving to Opportunity” 
Program). Along the same lines, time series evidence from Switzerland shows tougher enforce-
ment of mild crimes to reduce the incidence of severe crimes in later years (Funk and Kugler 
2003). In Los Angeles, neighbourhood deterioration preceded the onset of crime rates (Schuer-
man and Kobrin 1986). Yet, other studies did not find a significant effect (Novak, Hartman et al. 
1999; Katz, Webb et al. 2001; Geller 2007). They used a complex index of perceived social dis-
order as the independent variable (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999). Information about law-
abiding or the number of abandoned buildings did not have a significant influence either on 
young males’ beliefs about the risk of being convicted (Lochner 2007); (see also the mixed re-
sults by Taylor 2001; Rosenfeld, Fornango et al. 2007) (further see Blumstein 1995; Bowling 
1999; Messner, Galea et al. 2007: on the link to the exogenous evolution of the drug market). 
Yet others argue that the broken windows approach should be embedded into a broader assess-
ment of the relationship between neighbourhood change and crime (Taub, Taylor et al. 1984; 
Fagan 2008). Most importantly, it is far from undisputed whether correlation can be interpreted 
as causation (Harcourt 1998; Karmen 2000; Harcourt 2001; Sampson, Morenoff et al. 2002; 
Harcourt 2005; Harcourt and Ludwig 2006).  
                                        
1   For details, see Uniform Crime Reports, at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm . 3 
A city may have good reason to combat petty crime, or to police order, even below the threshold 
of criminal law, whether this reduces serious crime or not (Thacher 2004). Other cities may have 
equally sound reasons to prefer alternative strategies for containing crime, like gun control or 
affirmative action. They may rightly be concerned that their interventions should not foster the 
use of stereotypes like race (cf. Stewart 1998; Geller and Fagan 2010), and should not serve as a 
pretext for generating social segregation (Seiler 2008). We do not intend, in this paper, to side 
with either position. We are also not purporting to test broken windows theory in its entirety. We 
abstract from the possibility that perceived disorder attracts criminals to a community who did 
not inhabit it before. We are not studying the sudden change of a previously orderly neighbour-
hood to the worse, but have everybody start from scratch in a new environment. In our setting, 
disorder and crime are only distinct by the degree of antisocial behaviour, and are not qualita-
tively different. Loyal participants may at most fear losing some of their experimental income, 
not their lives, health or belongings. We work with all these simplifications in the interest of 
cleanly testing a key component of the theory: depending on first impressions people make in an 
environment, they behave differently. Metaphorically speaking, the first broken window changes 
a neighbourhood. We expect that all debating the broken windows approach would want to know 
whether this claim holds true. 
In the field, the fact that the window is not fixed (that panhandlers are free to molest passers by; 
that drunks congregate in the park; that rowdies menace shopkeepers) also gives a signal to those 
who have always been living in the area. They may read this as evidence that social cohesion is 
eroding. Yet normally they have many more sources of information, from which they draw their 
personal conclusions. They talk to each other, they read the local newspaper, they address them-
selves to the authorities. Therefore, in the field the effect of the signal is hard to identify (cf. Fa-
gan 2008:109 f. on identification problems when estimating the relationship between neighbour-
hood change and crime). Equally hard is identifying the motives of those who seem to behave 
differently. Do they move to another neighbourhood simply because they can afford it, because 
they want to send their children to a better school, because a new street has brought another sub-
urb within reach – or do they move out to protect themselves from the perceived risk of crime? Is 
the city centre less populated because people prefer to meet in private clubs, because shopping 
malls in the outskirts attract customers, because people spend more time watching TV – or be-
cause they infer from the (real or metaphorical) broken windows that the centre is no longer 
safe? 
To avoid such identification problems, in the experiments reported in this paper we create an 
artificial neighbourhood. We limit social interaction to a single behavioural parameter. We fully 
control information. The explanatory variable of interest is the impression participants happen to 
gather in the first period of repeated interaction in a randomly composed group of four. The ex-
perimental setting exposes participants to a social dilemma. Individually, each participant is best 
off if the remaining group members contribute to a joint project while she freerides. We measure 
the causal effect of first impressions on contributions in later rounds. In this setting, first impres-
sions do indeed have strong explanatory power. If participants are able to express disapproval 4 
and deter freeriding through costly punishment, with sufficiently favourable first impressions 
cooperation is stabilised in the long run, even if those punished are given a chance to strike back. 
If sanctions are excluded by design, cooperation decays. But conditional on first impressions, 
average contributions are higher, and the decay is slower. 
In the experimental literature on public goods, on which we capitalise (for overviews see Le-
dyard 1995; Zelmer 2003; Chaudhuri 2011), the successful dissolution of the social dilemma is 
explained by the fact that a typical (experimental) population is heterogeneous. While there is a 
small fraction of true altruists, and a substantially larger minority of hard-nosed egoists, the ma-
jority tends to be “conditional cooperators”. Such participants are willing to make (substantial) 
contributions to the joint project as long as they believe that a sufficiently large portion of the 
remaining members of their experimental group contributes (sufficiently much) as well (Fisch-
bacher, Gächter et al. 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). If participants arrive in the lab, all 
they know about cooperativeness in their group is that they are interacting with fellow students. 
In this logic, first impressions matter so strongly because they provide conditional cooperators 
with specific information about their individual group, and give them a chance to update their 
original belief about cooperativeness.  
Actually, the value of this signal is even greater. Not only does each and every conditional coop-
erator receive this signal herself. She may also be perfectly sure that the other group members 
simultaneously receive an identical signal. This second property of the signal matters to the ex-
tent that other group members are likely to be conditional cooperators, too. The setting then per-
mits the formation of coordinated second-order beliefs. Actually, for the participants in public-
good experiments, this is a testable proposition. In the next period, they directly receive a new 
signal, which they can use to check the reliability of their prediction, and to act accordingly.   
Experiments of necessity pay a price for control. They have to abstract from many features of the 
real life phenomenon they aim to explain. In our case, we believe that this price is not high. The 
closest analogue in the field is the behaviour of those who newly arrive in a neighbourhood, be 
that a family who moves in, a child who goes to a new school, or a person who visits a new area. 
That way, our results also speak to the class of persons broken windows theory is most interested 
in: criminals who consider entering a community since, reading the signals, they believe they 
stand a fair chance to get away with their illegal acts. We of course abstract from the decision to 
relocate criminal activity. But the participants of our experiments are in the same situation as a 
would-be criminal scanning neighbourhoods and choosing which one to enter.  
In our experiments the only exogenous source of variation is the random composition of groups 
of four. In the field, social interaction has a history. At one point in time, the first “broken win-
dows” are no longer repaired in a neighbourhood that used to be kept well until then. Yet the 
absence of a history in our design works against us. In our experiments, the contributions of the 
remaining group members in the first round of interaction are just a snapshot. Other group mem-
bers might have been uncertain. They might have made a mistake. If properly admonished of 
more demanding social expectations, their behaviour might well improve. By contrast for those 5 
who have been living in the neighbourhood for a while, the fact that disorder is no longer mend-
ed is much more informative, as are visible actions to restore order if it had eroded in the past. 
Therefore in the field a change in the degree of order is a much more reliable signal than the 
happenstance impressions our participants make in the first round of play. It is all the more re-
markable that they have such a strong effect on future cooperativeness. 
In our experiment, there is no formal separation between disorder and crime. But through the 
gradual nature of our dependent variable, we have a good proxy for “criminal invasion” (Wilson 
and Kelling 1982): if some have been a little below others’ expectations initially, chances are 
others will freeride even more intensely in later periods. This is exactly how contributions decay 
in groups where first impressions have not been good. 
In our experiments, just a few coins are at stake. Actually, these coins are even manna from 
heaven. Each round, each participant receives a fixed endowment. If all members of the group 
are perfectly cooperative, this endowment multiplies by a factor 1.6. If a participant is complete-
ly cooperative while all others exploit her, her payoff is reduced to 40% of the endowment. In 
the field, the inhabitant of a neighbourhood in decay may have to leave the house in which she 
was born, she may see her property burglarized, and may even fear for her life. In the field, 
through the power of fear small initial disorder may easily start a vicious cycle. One such story 
might be: initial signs of disorder cause fear. Residents stay at home. This weakens social con-
trol. First offenders invade the neighbourhood. Even more residents refrain from actively main-
taining order. Serious criminal activity is pulled to the neighbourhood. Yet once more our much 
more harmless design works against us, at least if we find that poor initial impressions lead to a 
longterm decay of socially desirable behaviour. For in our experiment, there is much less lever-
age for starting a vicious cycle.  
Seemingly, the problem of criminal policy is different in that the focus is not on proactive con-
tributions to a common good, but on the absence of antisocial behaviour. Yet as a group, the in-
habitants of an area are best off if everybody’s integrity and property are respected, while indi-
vidually, a criminal is best off if only the others refrain from crime, and she finds ample prey. 
Actually, through the very effect of first impressions we are demonstrating, the analogy even 
extends to disorder short of actual crime. For maintaining one’s property and demeanour, such 
that broken windows are mended, both literally and metaphorically, is a second order public 
good (cf. Yamagishi 1986; Heckathorn 1989). Individually, each member of the community is 
best off if others bear the cost of maintaining order, while she enjoys the peaceful environment. 
From the perspective of broken windows theory, this is not a minor issue. In their programmatic 
article, Wilson and Kelling claim: “The essence of the police role is to reinforce the informal 
control mechanisms of the community itself” (Wilson and Kelling 1982:6). Moreover, if at all, 
our experiments put people’s goodnaturedness to an even harder test. Typical criminal offences 
are backed by strong social norms. By contrast, in the naked public goods of our experiments 
cooperation is only in everybody’s best interest; low contributions are not patently at variance 
with legitimate social expectations. Since first impressions are already crucial in this context 6 
free, neutral setting, we can expect them to matter even more in the value-laden, culturally em-
bedded setting which the broken windows approach addresses. 
In other respects, our experiments exactly capture the mechanism adherents of broken windows 
theory believe to be crucial. In our experimental groups, all rule-making is implicit and local, as 
are sanctions. The communities have to rely on the self policing of vague rules of conduct (Wil-
son and Kelling 1982). 
The data which we use stems from a series of public-good experiments that were conducted by 
several authors all over the world; including our own, new contributions to this literature. Our 
data set features regular public-good games, public-good games with punishment opportunities, 
and public-good games with punishment and counter-punishment opportunities. On first inspec-
tion, this data does not appear very appealing for our purpose. In regular public-good experi-
ments, subjects’ contribution rates vary widely (for surveys see Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003; 
Chaudhuri 2011). While giving participants the costly opportunity to punish each other tends to 
raise average contributions (Fehr and Gächter 2002), there is still a high degree of variance in the 
observed contribution rates (Herrmann, Thöni et al. 2008). The variance is also present when 
those receiving punishment are given a chance to strike back (Denant-Boèment, Masclet et al. 
2007; Nikiforakis 2008), although contribution rates now drop on average. Essentially, the large 
body of experimental data appears almost chaotic; apparently independent of the design, some 
groups are able to sustain a considerable degree of cooperation throughout the game, while other 
groups completely fail. This even holds if experiments are run under the same protocol and in 
one and the same lab.
2  
However, as we demonstrate in this paper, the apparent puzzle dissolves as soon as we control 
for initial impressions. By the very fact that we can generate order in this dataset, we can show 
that “broken windows” destroy socially desirable behaviour, even under the context-free, clean 
conditions of a lab experiment. If others contribute a substantial amount of their endowment in 
the beginning, the group is very likely to collect a lot of money for the joint project. If initial im-
pressions are poor, the opposite effect can be predicted. Initial impressions also have a signifi-
cant effect if we control for the respective player’s own initial contributions, i.e., for her type. 
Thus, we do not measure favourable attitudes, but we indeed see the effect of one’s first impres-
sions about one’s environment on one’s behaviour.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 links our work to the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the dataset and the experimental designs. Section 4 presents and anal-
yses the results. Section 5 discusses implications for broken windows theory. 
                                        
2   For details, see the comparison below between our experiments and the Hermann experiments in the Bonn 
EconLab. 7 
2. Related  Literature 
The closest analogue to our study in the legal literature is a field experiment that randomly ex-
posed 12 of 24 matched violent crime places in Jersey City to intense police scrutiny and inter-
vention. In the places chosen, crime rates dropped substantially, while they did not in the unaf-
fected places (Braga, Weisburd et al. 1999). A further careful field experiment randomly ex-
posed crime and disorder hot spots in Lowell, Mass. to “shallow” vs. intense police efforts to 
restore order, to show that situational prevention strategies were most effective in curbing crime 
(Braga and Bond 2008). In a similar vein, in a series of sociological field experiments, when 
there were signs of disorder, like graffiti, abandoned shopping carts, or bicycles locked where 
they were not supposed to be, this induced passers-by also to break these and other rules (Keizer, 
Lindenberg et al. 2008). A further experiment is more tangential. It investigates under which 
conditions police officers prefer an intervention in the spirit of the broken windows approach, 
penalty notices for disorder, over arresting offenders (Coates, Kautt et al. 2009).  
Our dataset differs from all these studies in that our “intervention” is much more light-handed; it 
is confined to the first impressions subjects happen to make. Moreover, since we conducted lab 
experiments, we need not have second thoughts about the influence of explanatory variables be-
yond our control. A further advantage of our approach stems from the nature of both the depend-
ent and the independent variables. In the field, both are categorical: people either break the law 
or they obey it; people either see disorder or they do not. In our setting, “disorder” is measured 
by the distance from socially optimal behaviour, and socially desirable behaviour is measured by 
the amount bystanders contribute to the joint project. Due to that feature, we are also able to dis-
tinguish between the overall level of disorder and the maximum disorder participants experience 
in the group of which they happen to be a member. Finally, since all our data is from games re-
peated over 10 periods, we can also analyse the dynamics triggered by favourable or unfavoura-
ble first impressions. 
Another lab experiment from the legal literature demonstrates that the law can serve as a focal 
point if participants perceive the situation as a coordination problem (McAdams and Nadler 
2008). We, however, go one step further, in that our setting exposes participants to a true dilem-
ma. In game-theoretic parlance, we are studying a prisoner’s dilemma, while the previous exper-
iment tested a hawk/dove game. Since in a prisoner’s dilemma defection is a dominant strategy, 
ours is an even stronger test for the power of orientation.  
In the economics literature, the closest analogue is an experiment where, in a first stage, partici-
pants were screened for their cooperativeness. In the second stage, they played a standard public-
good game, knowing that they were interacting with partners that scored like them in the pre-test. 
In a voluntary contribution mechanism, this unequivocally increased cooperation, even for those 
scoring low in the pre-test. However with punishment, overall contributions decayed, due to very 
poor performance of those scoring low in the pre-test (Gächter and Thöni 2007). The effect of 
sorting is positive throughout if subjects are rematched every round according to their coopera-
tiveness in the previous round (Gunnthorsdotir, Houser et al. 2007). Likewise, if groups have a 8 
chance to exclude freeriders, this improves cooperation in a dilemma setting (Cinyabuguma, 
Page et al. 2005; Croson, Fatas et al. 2008), as does a mechanism that allows members to self-
select into groups (Page, Putterman et al. 2005), in particular if freeriders are effectively exclud-
ed by a rule that sacrifices a portion of the group income to outsiders (the Red Cross, as it was) 
(Brekke, Hauge et al. 2009). Our study differs from this literature in that all we use is an element 
present in any public good game, and in any real life social dilemma: the first impressions partic-
ipants happen to make. 
Finally, we make a methodological contribution to the burgeoning field of experimental crimi-
nology (Farrington 2003; Farrington and Welsh 2005; Farrington 2006; Telep 2009). We show 
how meaningful and productive it is to apply standard tools from experimental economics to a 
longstanding issue in criminology. 
3.  Design and Data 
A public good is characterised by two features: everybody benefits from a joint project, whether 
she has contributed to its provision or not; if one person has received a benefit, the good is still 
as valuable for everybody else as is was before. In the theoretical literature, the first feature is 
called the impossibility of excluding beneficiaries. The second feature is described by the fact 
that one person’s consumption does not rival with other persons’ consumption. A public good is 
a special instance of a prisoner’s dilemma. The group is best off if all contribute to the provision 
of the good.
3 Yet each group member is best off if only the others contribute while she freerides 
(for background see Cornes and Sandler 1996). As mentioned in the introduction, the absence of 
crime may be modelled as a public good. As a group, the inhabitants of a neighbourhood are best 
off if everybody’s life, limb and property are safe. Yet if a criminal expects all others to desist 
from crime, and if there is no credible vigilance and deterrence, her individual best response is 
criminal activity. This of course presupposes that this person derives utility from violating other 
persons’ freedom and property. In the field, this will not hold for everybody, but it is likely to 
hold at least for some.  
Actually, there is a second order problem which comes even closer to the core of broken win-
dows theory. As explained in the introduction, the theory expects visible disorder to engender 
crime. Now maintaining order (“repairing broken windows”) is often costly, or risky, or both. 
Then each of those who have no inclination to engage in criminal activity faces a second public 
good. If order is meticulously maintained, chances are that criminals do not invade the neigh-
bourhood. Yet as long as others see to this, those abstaining from investment in order receive a 
free lunch (for background see Yamagishi 1986; Heckathorn 1989).  
                                        
3   If the production function is linear, as in our implementation, the group is even best off if all contribute max-
imally, i.e. if they invest their entire endowments. 9 
In our experiments, we expose participants to such a situation. Players interact repeatedly for 10 
periods in groups of size 4. The situation is fully symmetric, which all participants know. Specif-
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Thus each period each participant receives 20 tokens from the experimenter. She is free to keep 
all of them, or to invest them partly or fully in the joint project. Each token she keeps gives her 1 
token. Each token she invests only gives her 0.4 tokens. Yet she also receives 0.4 tokens for eve-
ry token any other group member has invested into the project. Hence the entire group gains 1.6 
tokens from each token invested. A participant is best off if all others have contributed fully, 
while she has contributed nothing. She then has 20 – 0 + 0.4*60 = 44 tokens. She is worse off if 
all others have contributed nothing while she alone has invested fully. She then has 20 – 20 + 
0.4*20 = 8 tokens.  
In the literature, an experimental game with this structure is called a voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM). Our dataset also encompasses data from two variants. In the first variant, 
after all group members have decided how much to contribute to the project, they are informed 
about contributions by the remaining three group members. They are given the opportunity to 
react by spending some of their period income on reducing other group members’ incomes. In 
the second variant, after participants have decided about punishment, players receive feedback 
about the punishment decision made by others and can then spend some of the remaining period 
income to punish those who have punished them. Since we wanted to merge our own data with 
data from other experimenters, we have kept the non-linear punishment technology originally 
used by (Fehr and Gächter 2000). It is explained in the Appendix.  
Public goods experiments are a standard tool of experimental economics. In our own experi-
ments, we moreover have used parameters that are standard in this literature. This provides us 
with the opportunity to test the effect of first impressions in a much larger dataset. To that end, 
the following is partly a reanalysis of data from public good experiments that are already pub-
lished (Denant-Boèment, Masclet et al. 2007; Herrmann, Thöni et al. 2008; Nikiforakis 2008), 
and partly of our own, hitherto unpublished data. The total dataset comprises 17880 datapoints, 
or data from 1788 participants.   
Table 1 informs about the different design features and parameters in more detail. All games are 
played in groups of four, with an endowment of 20 tokens per player. Each token contributed to 
the project increased each group member’s payoff by 0.4 tokens. 
The first column indicates whether participants had no technology for targeted sanctions (VCM), 
or whether they could punish each other without (Pun) or with the risk of counterpunishment 
(CPun). The second column lists whether subjects stayed together in the same group of four 
throughout the game (partner design, P) or whether they were rematched every round (stranger 
design, S). Column three has identifiers for each experiment, to be used in later tables. The 10 
fourth column indicates the origin of the data, where MPI denotes our own experimental data, 
DEN is data provided by Denant-Boèment et al. (2007),
4 NIK is data taken from Nikiforakis 
(2008), and HER is data published in Herrmann et al. (2008), which consists of 16 structurally 
identical experiments run in different countries.
5 The fifth column gives the total number of indi-
vidual decisions in the respective dataset. More detail on experimental procedure and on the in-













VCM P  2  MPI  240  -  -  - 
VCM P  12  NIK  960  -  -  - 
VCM P  18  MPI  480  -  -  - 
VCM S  13  NIK  960  -  -  - 
Pun P  6  DEN  480  FG  - - 
Pun P  11  MPI  240  FG  - - 
Pun P  14  NIK  480  FG  - - 
Pun P  16  HER  10400  1:3  - - 
Pun S  15  NIK  480  FG  - - 
CPun P  1 MPI 680  FG FG own 
CPun P  3 NIK 480  FG FG own 
CPun P  7 DEN  480  FG FG all 
CPun P  8 DEN  480  FG FG others 
CPun P  9 DEN  480  FG FG own 
CPun P  10  MPI 480  FG SEV  own 
CPun S  4 NIK 480  FG FG own 





The sixth and seventh columns denote which punishment or, as the case may be, counter-
punishment technologies were used. Here, 1:3 indicates that a linear technology was used where 
each punishment point assigned costs 1 token and reduces the other’s payoff by 3 tokens, FG 
indicates that the non-linear technology introduced by Fehr and Gächter (2000) was used, which 
is described in the Appendix. SEV indicates that a severe technology was used, where each as-
signed counter-punishment point costs 1 token and reduces the receiver’s net payoff (after the 
effect of received and the cost of given punishment are subtracted) by 25 %. The last column 
describes the amount of information that subjects were given on the counter-punishment stage, 
where own indicates that subjects only knew the amount of punishment they had received them-
selves, others indicates that subjects only knew by how much the other members of the group 
had been punished, and all indicates that subjects knew whether and by how much each subject 
had been punished. 
                                        
4   The original dataset of Denant-Boèment et al. (2007) contains 20 periods. To keep datasets comparable, only 
the first ten periods of each matching group are considered in our analysis. 
5   Athens (Number of observations N = 440), Bonn (600), Boston (560), Chengdu (960), Copenhagen (680), 
Dnipropetrovs’k (440), Istanbul (640), Melbourne (400), Minsk (680), Muscat (520), Nottingham (560), Ri-
yadh (480), Samara (720), Seoul (840), St. Gallen (960), Zurich (920). 11 
4. Results 
For criminal policy, these experiments are of interest because for each individual participant the 
decisions of the remaining three group members in the first round generate randomly assigned 
first impressions about the degree of social or antisocial behaviour in a fully controlled environ-
ment. If the behaviour of participants in later rounds can be explained by their experiences in the 
first round, we have shown that first impressions determine (anti-)social behaviour. To provide 
this test, we proceed in two steps. We first neglect this explanation. If we do, the data almost 
appears chaotic. Despite the fact that different experimenters have used the identical design, re-
sults look vastly different. The puzzle dissolves once we control for our explanatory variable of 
interest, i.e. first impressions. We thus can not only show that first impressions significantly ex-
plain the data. Controlling for first impressions is even a precondition for making sense of the 
evidence. If one ignores first impressions, one cannot properly explain the degree of (anti-) so-
cial behaviour. 
a) The  Puzzle 
As can be seen in Table 2, overall means are representative of what is typically found in the cor-
responding designs: contributions are higher if the same four players stay together over all ten 
periods, compared to the stranger protocol where they are randomly re-matched every period. 
Contributions are lowest in the absence and highest in the presence of punishment opportunities. 
Counter-punishment dampens contribution rates, though they are still substantially higher than 
without punishment. 
 VCM CPun  Pun  Total 
Stranger 5.41 10.29 11.63 8.71 
Partner 7.63 13.28 13.57 12.90





Yet, if we look at the mean contribution rate for each dataset individually, one already sees the 
seemingly chaotic nature of the data (cp.   
Figure 1). There is huge variance in the mean contribution rates. Even if we control for the 
matching protocol, the data still looks unstructured. For instance for CPun the lowest mean is 
observed under stranger matching, while the lowest mean in VCM and in punishment stems from 
partner matching. Also if we control for the location of the laboratories, contribution rates re-
main rather unstructured. In all locations there is huge variance within data from one and the 
same lab. For example, although our own experiments that were run in Bonn have the highest 
means in all three game types, in the Hermann data set there is an identical experiment in the 
same lab where mean contributions are only 14.49, while they are 14.65 in Seoul, 15.01 in Not-
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Mean Contributions per Experiment 
 
There is huge variation even within each experimental design, with mean contributions per ex-
periment ranging between [5.16 11.48] in the VCM-designs, [6.72 16.68] in CPun, and [5.70 
18.46] in Pun. This variation is also stable across the periods of the respective experiment. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates this with the counter-punishment data, displaying mean contributions per treat-
ment and period. In all periods, mean contribution rates differ substantially between experiments. 
The first column in   
Table 3 shows that most of these differences even reach statistical significance.  
The most striking result is from the MPI Severe treatment (exp # 10). In this experiment we 
made counterpunishment extremely powerful. At the cost of just one token, participants could 
destroy a quarter of the period income of those who had punished them. Nonetheless, contribu-
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exp #  1 5 10 3 4 9 
data-set MPI MPI MPI NIK NIK DB 
partner PS PP S P  
# of ind. observations  17 6 12 12 4 6 
1 -  
5 2.311* -  
10 -1.063 -1.593 -  
3 3.410*** 1.686* 3.061*** -  
4 2.688** 1.919* 2.548** .728 -  
9 2.871** 1.441 2.718** .281 -.640  - 
 
Table 3 
Pairwise comparisons of mean contributions 
per matching group between counter-punishment datasets (two-sided ranksum test) 
z values, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
b)  Broken Windows in the Lab 
The apparent chaos dissolves as soon as we control for initial impressions. Our experiments pro-
vide us with random variation of first impressions. Groups are randomly composed. After they 
have decided how much to contribute to the project themselves, participants receive feedback 
about average (VCM) or individual contributions to the project in their group (Pun and CPun). 
Now they know how cooperative the other group members have been in the initial period of in-
teraction. Our data shows that even when any context is deliberately and painstakingly removed, 
people are strongly impressed by the experiences they make when they enter such an artificial 
community. If “the windows are broken”, i.e., if other participants are selfish and do not contrib-
ute to the joint project, they reduce their contributions as well. In Figure 3, we plot the mean con-
tribution in the first period versus the mean contribution in the nine subsequent periods. If a point 
lies on the y=x line, initial impressions have fully determined subsequent behaviour. We find 
that the VCM results lie somewhat below this line, Pun results lie somewhat above it, and CPun 14 
results can be found on either side of the line. This is what one should have expected. The pun-
ishment opportunity provides participants with a technology to deter freeriding. If the recipients 
of punishment may strike back, the power of this technology is weakened. In the VCM treat-
ments, participants lack any sanctioning technology. This slight qualification resulting from the 
different institutional framework notwithstanding, the correlation between first period’s impres-
sion and subsequent behaviour is clearly visible in all three game-types. Note that we are not 
only demonstrating a detrimental effect from observing “broken windows”. We also show that 
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mean contributions periods 2-10 vs. mean contributions in period 1
 
Figure 3 
Effect of Average Contributions in the First Period 
Mean contributions in all periods, of course, excludes the first period’s contribution 
 
Average contributions in the first period inform subjects about the level of cooperativeness in 
their group. Additionally, they learn how strongly they risk being exploited by looking at the first 
period’s minimum contribution in their group. We thus not only observe whether any “windows 
are broken” in the community. We also observe, on a gradual scale, how badly the worst member 
of the group behaves, and how this affects the behaviour of other group members in later rounds. 
As Figure 4 shows, minimum contributions in the first period and mean contributions over all 
periods are related as well. The higher the minimum contribution in the first period, the higher 
the overall contributions in this group. The fact that most points lie above the y=x line reflects 
that, on average, the remaining participants do not behave as poorly in later periods as the worst 
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Figure 4 
Effect of Minimum Contribution in the First Period 
 
The impressions from the graphs are supported by regression analysis. A first series of regres-
sions reported in Table 4 only uses means per group of four, over periods 2-10 each, as the de-
pendent variable. Regressor av1 is the average of the contributions of the four group members, in 
the first period. Regressor min1 is the smallest contribution of one of these four members, again 
in the first period. In the reference category, group members are rematched every period. They 
stay together in the Partner design. In the reference category, targeted punishment is not possi-
ble. This is different in Pun. While in CPun, there is also punishment, it comes at the risk of 
counterpunishment.  
In model 1, which controls for partner vs. stranger design, and for VCM vs. punishment vs. 
counterpunishment, plus the average contribution in the first period, we explain 61% of the vari-
ance. In the second model, the minimum contribution in the first period is also highly significant. 
We still explain 46% of the variance. However, if we add both regressors (model 3), the estimate 
for min1 is very small and insignificant. The adjusted R
2 is virtually the same as in model 1. As 
model 4 demonstrates, this is due to the interaction between both parameters for initial impres-
sions. If one adds the interaction term, min1 is again significantly positive, while the interaction 
term is small, but negative. This result is best interpreted in an example. Assume a VCM stranger 
game with av1 = 15, min1 = 10. Then model 4 predicts -4.081 [cons] + 15*.853 [av1] + 10*.390 
[min1] – 15*10*.021 [av1*min1] = 9.464 mean contributions. The more both first impressions 
are favourable, the more their combined effect has to be discounted. But in relative terms, dis-
counting is small. It never reverses either main effect. There is no significant interaction between 
either av1 or min1 and the partner design (model 5).  16 
Yet model 6 shows that first impressions matter more, and differently, with either punishment or 
counterpunishment. If one controls for these interactions, the main effect of av1 is no longer sig-
nificant, while the main effect of min1 is. Again the prediction is best understood in an example. 
Assume a punishment stranger game, again with av1 = 15, min1 = 10. Model 6 predicts -.981 
[cons] + 15*.396 [av1] + 10*.860 [min1] + 1.421 [ptreat] – 15*10*.021 [av1*min1] + 15*.733 
[av1*ptreat] – 10*.546 [min1*ptreat] = 17.365. Compare the regressors for av1 and av1*ptreat, 
and for min1 and min1*ptreat: While the effect of av1 becomes even stronger with punishment, 
the effect of min1 is reduced (but the overall effect is still positive).  
This is intuitive: punishment gives participants a chance to discipline freeriders. They are the 
more likely to make productive use of this opportunity, the more the overall impression from the 
group is positive. The respective interaction terms with counterpunishment draw the same pic-
ture. This indicates that, behaviourally, counterpunishment is mainly punishment. Interestingly, 
in model 6 the main effects for punishment and counterpunishment are no longer significant. The 
main effect is fully explained by the interactions with av1 and min1. We learn that “broken win-
dows” not only deteriorate the willingness of bystanders to abide by the law. They also reduce 
their preparedness to defend the law themselves (punishment) and to do so at the risk of being 
attacked in reaction (counterpunishment). Not only law obedience suffers. Courage to stand up 
for the common good wanes as well. 
 
  model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5  model 6 
av1  .851***    .810***  .853***    .835***  .396    
min1    .578***  .042  .390**     .547*  .860**   
av1*min1        -.021**     -.020**  -.021**   
partner .873 1.006  .845 .881 1.284  3.238 
av1*partner       .017  -.234 
min1*partner       -0.162  .035 
Pun  7.272*** 6.660*** 7.243*** 7.049***    7.011***  1.474 
CPun  6.139*** 5.872*** 6.119*** 5.845***    5.793***  -.871 
av1*Pun                           .733***  
min1*Pun                           -.546***  
av1*CPun                           .791**   
min1*CPun                           -.552*    
Cons -3.872***  2.872*** -3.549*** -4.081***    -4.429*  -.981 
N  405 405  405 405 405  405 
adj R
2  .618 .469  .617 .624 .622  .628 
 
Table 4 
Effect of First Impressions on Mean Contributions per Group 
OLS, robust standard errors, period 1 excluded, 
reference group: VCM stranger 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
First impressions do not only matter for the level, but also for the development of contributions 
over time. We again first only use one observation per group as the dependent variable. Our de-17 
pendent variable trend  is itself the result of an auxiliary regression. For each group, we sepa-
rately run a fixed effects regression explaining contributions with period (and a constant).
6 Vari-
able trend is the coefficient of regressor period in this auxiliary regression. A positive trend 
means that, in this group, contributions increase over time. The positive regressors for partner, 
ptreat and cptreat in   
Table 5 corroborate what is generally observed: in the partner design, and with punishment, con-
tributions are more likely to increase over time. Once more, min1 is insignificant without the 
interaction term (model 1), but significant if one adds the interaction (model 2). Interestingly, the 
regressor for av1 is negative throughout. This finding should be put into perspective. If partici-
pants stay together for the entire game, and if they can punish each other, even if all had contrib-
uted the maximum of 20 in the first round, the trend remains positive.
7 Moreover if the minimum 
contribution in the first round is high, the negative coefficient for av1 is neutralised. Initial over-
all impressions only lose their influence over time if both the worst group member behaved very 
badly in the first round, and if institutions are not powerful enough to bring her under control. 
From a policy perspective, the finding for min1 is most relevant.  High min1 can be equated with 
a setting where no windows are broken at all, or where infractions are at most very minor. Ac-
cording to our regression, in such a context, not only a high overall degree of socially desirable 
behaviour can be expected. One can even expect that the willingness to contribute to the com-
mon good grows substantially over time, the more so, the better the worst member behaved ini-
tially. 
 
  model 1  model 2 
av1 -.035**  -.031** 
min1 .005  .041* 
av1*min1  -.002 
partner .368*** .372***
Pun .442*** .422***
CPun .230*  .202* 
cons -.186  -.242 
N 405  405 
adj R
2 .153 .158 
 
Table 5 
Explaining Trend of Contributions over Time per Group 
OLS, robust standard errors, period 1 excluded 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Level and slope means per group do not exploit the full richness of our dataset. More importantly 
even, at the level of groups we cannot distinguish between a person’s own willingness to con-
tribute in the first round and the contributions of the remaining group members. We cannot rule 
                                        
6   Since, in this model, the only regressor is time-dependent, a random effects model would not be more effi-
cient; which is why we directly go for the consistent model with individual fixed effects. All models are 
it i it period trend y ε α + + = *  
7   .372 [partner] +.422 [ptreat] – 20*.031 [av1] = .174. 18 
out that the effects we observe in periods 2-10 just reflect differences in group composition. Our 
results would say something about ex ante heterogeneity, not about the causal effect of initial 
experiences on later behaviour. However at the individual level, we can disentangle the effect of 
one’s type from the effect of initial experiences. To that end, we apply a random effects model 
that uses all contributions of all subjects in all periods,
8  
Table 6  Model 1 shows that the positive effect of average contributions at the group level does 
not just reflect the exogenously given type of players. While this type is captured by the own 
contributions of the respective player in the first round (i.e., by variable con1), there is an inde-
pendent effect of the average contributions of the remaining three players in the first round (i.e., 
of variable avf1). Model 2 shows that the same holds true for the minimum contribution of an-
other player in the first round. Variable minf1 has a significant independent positive effect for a 
player’s contributions in later periods if one controls for her own contributions in the first period. 
As with group data on all four players, if one simultaneously adds the average and the minimum 
contribution of one of the remaining players as a regressor, minimum contributions are no longer 
significant, model 3. They are again weakly significant if one adds the interaction of average and 
minimum contributions to the model, model 4. The interaction term itself is significant and nega-
tive. As with group data, the combined positive effect of high average and high minimum contri-
butions in the first round is somewhat corrected downwards. 
Model 5 conveys an interesting message: while the beneficial effect of a player’s type decays 
over time, this is not the case with the positive effect of initial impressions. Model 6 looks at dif-
ferential effects for treatments. The beneficial effect of high average contributions, by the re-
maining players in the first round, is strongest with counterpunishment, and slightly less pro-
nounced with punishment. To appreciate the size of the effect, consider the following example: 
the experiment allows for punishment and counterpunishment in the stranger design; the player 
under consideration has contributed 5 units in the first round; on average the remaining players 
have contributed 10 units; the minimum contribution was 1 unit. For contributions in the fifth 
round, the model predicts a contribution of 7.637 units. If the otherwise identical parameters are 
from a game with punishment only, the model predicts contributions of 9.641. The larger main 
effect for punishment is ultimately more important than the smaller interaction with average con-
tributions in the first round. It even neutralises the negative interaction with minimum contribu-
tions in the first round.  
Model 7 adds the three-way interactions of initial conditions with treatment and period. Compar-
ing with the two-way interaction between the respective initial condition and period, one learns 
                                        
8   On all models, the Hausman test is insignificant, so that we are justified in using the more efficient random 
effects model. Qualitatively, results look very similar if we run a random effects Tobit model. In particular, 
the picture on trend variables (period, con1*period, avf1*period, minf1*period, con1*period*ptreat, 
avf1*period*ptreat, minf1*period*ptreat, con1*period*cptreat, avf1*period*cptreat, minf1*period*cptreat) 
remains the same. We may thus be sure that these trend variables do not reflect bottom or ceiling effects. Re-
sults also look very similar if we guard against potential inconsistency problems in a dynamic panel by only 
using data from periods 3 on. 
 19 
that the beneficial effect of type decays less quickly with punishment or counterpunishment, but 
that the combined effect of the two-way and the three-way interactions is still negative. Conse-
quently, even when there is punishment or counterpunishment, the beneficial effect of type is not 
stable. This is different with the effect of average contributions of the remaining players in the 
first round, when there is punishment. The combined effect of the two-way and the three-way 
interactions is (slightly) positive (-.047 + .051 = .004). This qualifies the finding at the group 
level regarding the negative effect of regressor av1 on variable trend. The negative effect at the 
group level results from the dwindling effect of the player’s own type (which enters the calcula-
tion of av1), not from initial impressions. 
  model 1  model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6  model 7
con1  .409*** .457*** .409*** .411*** .624*** .561*** .718***
avf1 .423***    .437*** .476*** .499*** .221
+ .483***
minf1 
  .266*** -.013 .160
+ .152
+ .293** .235* 
avf1*minf1     -.011* -.011* -.008
  -.008
 
period -.049  -.049 -.049 -.049 .379*** .379***  .411***
con1*period     -.035*** -.035***  -.062***
avf1*period     -.004 -.004  -.047***
minf1*period     .001 .001  .011 
partner .923  1.364* .911 1.037
+ 1.037
+ 1.374* 1.374*
Pun  6.924*** 6.962*** 6.920*** 6.908*** 6.908*** 4.331*** 4.331***
con1*Pun     .065  -.139* 
avf1*Pun    .312*  .009 
minf1*Pun     -.234*  -.168
+ 
CPun 5.510***  5.879*** 5.495*** 5.485*** 5.485*** 1.873  1.873 
con1*CPun     .093
+ -.036 
avf1*CPun     .368*  .249
 
minf1*CPun 
   -.213  -.289* 
con1*period*Pun 
    .034***
con1*period*CPun     .022**
avf1*period*Pun     .051***
avf1*period*CPun     .020 
minf1*period*Pun     -.011 
minf1*period*CPun     .013 
cons  -3.008*** -1.111* -3.052*** -3.680*** -6.246*** -4.049*** -4.244***
N  16092 16092 16092 16092 16092 16092 16092 
p  model  <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
R
2  within  .001 .001 .001 .001 .029 .029 .077 
R
2  between  .579 .547 .579 .581 .581 .586 .586 
R
2  overall  .426 .403 .426 .428 .435 .439 .451 
 
Table 6 
Explaining Individual Contributions with First Impressions 
Random Effects, robust standard errors, clustered for groups (405 clusters), period 1 excluded 
Hausman test insignificant on all models 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
Of course, all of the previous analysis can be redone at the level of game types,   
Table 7. Interestingly, in the stranger design, first impressions do only have explanatory power in 
the treatment with counterpunishment. This is intuitive. In the stranger design, impressions from 20 
the first period are a much weaker signal than in the partner design. The respective player only 
learns something about the large group of participants within which players are rematched every 
round. Arguably, counterpunishment introduces so much uncertainty, though, that even this 
weak signal from the first period becomes valuable. Moreover, while the beneficial effect of a 
player’s type decays over time in all treatments, the beneficial effect of first impressions only 
decays if there is no punishment and if players stay in matched groups for the entire game. Put 
differently, if there is punishment, even if it is more risky due to counterpunishment, initial im-
pressions have a more stable effect than the autonomous benevolence of a player. If society is 
able to quickly repair broken windows, this matters more than the good-naturedness of many.  
VCM/Pun/CPun VCM  VCM  Pun  Pun  CPun  CPun 
P/S  P S P S P S 
        
con1  .675*** .642*** .586*** .624*** .625*** .730*** 
avf1  .537**  .280 .576***  .472 .716***  .780*** 
minf1  .054 .164 .092 -.016  .256 .257 
avf1*minf1 .002  -.018 -.012
+ -.015  -.020  -.038** 
period .569**  -.180  .514***  .920***  .519*  -.031 
con1*period  -.060*** -.057*** -.029*** -.034*** -.045*** -.028** 
avf1*period  -.077***  .022  -.008 -.020 -.021 -.012 
minf1*period .043*  -.026*  .007  -.026  .012  .027
+ 
cons  -3.441 1.311  .539  .788  -1.018 -2.798***
        
N  1440  864 10224  432 2164  1008 
N  cluster  40  8 284  4 59  10 
R
2  within  .2380 .2032 .0325 .0807 .0574 .0655 
R
2  between .5634 .3999 .5242 .3635 .4410 .6176 
R
2  overall  .4270 .2878 .3912 .2353 .3353 .4609 
 
Table 7 
Separate Regressions for Types of Games 
Random Effects, depvar contribution, period 1 excluded, robust standard errors, clustered per matching group 
Hausman test insignificant on all models 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
For criminal policy, it is not only of interest how well those who see that “windows are broken” 
behave themselves. It also is relevant to which degree inhabitants of a neighbourhood are willing 
to “repair windows”, i.e. to exert costly effort to maintain and restore order. The experimental 
analogue is their willingness to engage in costly punishment, which we can investigate in 10656 
observations. Model 1 of   
Table 8 only shows a significant effect of the smallest contribution in the first period. The coeffi-
cient is negative. Hence the better initial impressions in this respect, the less likely participants 
are to punish others. This is no support for a broken windows effect, but intuitive. The better be-
haved even the worst performing group member, the less there is need for disciplining the group. 
If we interact the player’s own contribution in the first period with the average contribution of 
the remaining group members (model 2), the picture clears, and we find support for a broken 21 
windows effect. Participants are the more likely to punish others the more other group members 
were well-behaved in the beginning. 
  model 1  model 2 
con1 -.0057  .0980*** 
avf1 -.0212  .0591* 
con1*avf1  -.0096***
minf1 -.0697***  -.0530** 
period -.1060***  -.1078***
partner -.1938  -.1057 
cons 1.0389*** .1076 
    
N 10656  10656 
N cluster  288  288 
Pseudo R
2 .0563  .0717 
 
Table 8 
Willingness to Restore Order 
depvar: dummy that is 1 if this participant, in this period, has punished at least one other group member 
data from experiments with punishment 
Logit, standard errors clustered at the highest level of dependence, i.e. matching groups 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our own results, together with a reanalysis of data from 30 experiments conducted all over the 
world, suggest that contribution rates in public-good experiments are highly sensitive to first im-
pressions. Subjects seem to be most attentive to the level of the contributions of others in the first 
period. If there is a punishment option, the positive effect of high initial average contributions is 
even stronger. If initial impressions are sufficiently good, cooperation stabilises. In the controlled 
situation of our experiments, one component of the broken windows approach could be proven to 
be true: If people newly arrive in a setting and if the signals they read indicate a low level of co-
operativeness, people react by ignoring the common good themselves. This means two things: 
they are more likely to misbehave themselves, and they are less likely to discipline others. 
The closest real-world analogue to our setting is a person who is new to a neighbourhood. If this 
person perceives a neat environment, she expects to be treated well if she behaves well herself, 
and she helps maintain order if she spots signs of erosion. Note that we do not even need norma-
tivity to make this prediction. If, in addition, this person is generally willing to abide by the nor-
mative expectations prevalent in this community, of course the effect is even stronger. Neither 
do we need true altruists. All we need is a sufficient proportion of conditional cooperators plus, 
crucially, the right signals for those who newly enter the community. 
In many respects, our experiments have been designed in a way that is congenial to broken win-
dows theory. We observe the minor signs of disorder that this theory posits to be crucial. There 
are no explicit rules for what "order" means. Normative expectations are idiosyncratic for each 
context, and have to be inferred from behaviour. In other respects, we put the effect of first im-22 
pressions to an even harder test: we cannot expect pre-existing social norms to guide behaviour, 
and there are no public officials who could help the community define expectations, and enforce 
them if necessary. We deprive participants of any social history, which makes the contributions 
of others in the first period of interaction a much noisier signal than a decay of order in a previ-
ously prosperous neighbourhood. Participants at most loose a bit of experimental money if they 
spot signs of antisocial behaviour, while they have reason to fear much more in the field. There-
fore a vicious cycle should be much more powerful in the field.  
Of course, the experimental environment is much poorer and much more artificial than a neigh-
bourhood faced with the onset of crime. And for sure all we are testing is one component of bro-
ken windows theory: the power of first impressions. Yet these limitations inherent in our method 
are the price we are paying for the possibility to isolate this effect, and to fully identify it. 
With these obvious qualifications, our message to policymakers is straightforward. Money spent 
on impression management is likely to be money well spent. We can even be more specific. 
While good first impressions raise overall contributions in the voluntary contribution mecha-
nism, and while they flatten the characteristic negative trend of contributions over time, they are 
not strong enough to reverse the trend. As many others have shown, both in the lab (Selten, 
Mitzkewitz et al. 1997) and in the field (Ostrom 1990), for cooperation to be sustainable, vigi-
lance and enforcement are inevitable. However, sanctions alone are also not sufficient. The 
Hermann et al. experiments are particularly impressive on this. If overall performance was poor 
in a location, this was typically not due to a lack of (costly) punishment (Herrmann, Thöni et al. 
2008). Our data suggests that the combination of favourable initial impressions and the existence 
of a sanctioning mechanism is essential. Being determined to prosecute culprits is thus not 
enough. In a consequentialist perspective, it is at least as important to manage impressions. Be-
ware of broken windows! 23 
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Appendix 1: Experimental Procedure of Our Own Experiments 
As can be seen from Table 1, six of the 17 data sets stem from experiments conducted at the Max 
Planck Institute for Research von Collective Goods in Bonn. Subjects were randomly recruited 
from the BonnEconLab’s pool of about 3,500 subjects, mainly students (from all kind of majors), 
and participated in one of the treatments as indicated in the table below. None of them had pre-
vious experience in public good games, with the exception of participants of experiments #2 and 
#11, which were conducted with subjects that had before participated in experiment #10 (severe 
counter-punishment technology) as a first part of the respective session. 
After subjects arrived in the lab, they were randomly and anonymously assigned to matching 
groups. Subjects then received a written copy of the instructions. Additionally, in order to create 
common information about the instructions, we read them out aloud to our subjects. The instruc-
tions were written in a neutral language, avoiding words like punishment, sanctions, counter-
punishment etc. Instead, we used terms like “to assign points”, “direct points”, “transfer to a pro-
ject”, etc, which have been previously used in comparable studies. The instructions used were 
those of Fehr and Gächter (2000) unless otherwise indicated in the table below. For those exper-
iments that made use of a modified version of these instructions, an English translation of the 
German instructions is included in Appendix 3. The instructions in German are available from 
the authors upon request.  Before the game started, participants had to answer a set of control 
questions to make sure that everybody had understood the rules of the game. The experiment 
lasted for approximately 60 minutes. Subjects were paid according to their cumulated period 
payoffs. The experiments were programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007) and participants were 












T  instructions 
VCM  P  2 
22 April 
2008 
1  24  10 
Fehr + Gächter 
(2000) 
VCM  P  18  7 April 2008  2  40  12 
Fehr + Gächter 
(2000) 
but over 12 periods
Pun  P  11 
22 April 
2008 
1  24  10 
Fehr + Gächter 
(2000) 
CPun  P  1 
24 January 
2008 and 14 
February 
2008 
5  68  10   Nikiforakis (2008) 
CPun  P  10 
22 April 
2008 





CPun  S  5 
4 March 
2008 
3  64  10  Nikiforakis (2008) 
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Appendix 2: Instructions for the Severe Counterpunishment  
Treatment (Experiment # 10) 
General explanations for participants 
You are taking part in an economic science experiment. If you read the following explanations 
closely, then you can earn a rather significant sum of money, depending on the decisions you 
make. It is therefore very important that you pay attention to the following points.  
The instructions you have received from us are intended solely for your private information. 
During the experiment, you will not be allowed to communicate with anyone. Should you 
have any questions, please direct them directly to us. Not abiding by this rule will lead to exclu-
sion from the experiment and from any payments.  
In this experiment, we calculate in taler, rather than in euro. Your entire income will therefore 
initially be calculated in taler. The total sum of taler will later be calculated in euro as follows: 
1 Taler = 4 Euro cent 
In addition to the 4 euro for showing up, each participant will receive from us one instalment of 
25 taler, with which you will be able to counterbalance potential losses. However, you will al-
ways be in a position to exclude with certainty the possibility of losses, with your own deci-
sions! The taler you will have accumulated and the 4 euro will be paid to you in cash at the end 
of the experiment.  
The experiment consists of two parts. To begin with, the first part will be explained. Explana-
tions concerning the second part will be given later.  
The experiment is divided into separate periods. It consists of a total of 10 periods. Participants 
are randomly assigned into groups of four. Each group, thus, has three further members, apart 
from you. During these 10 periods, the constellation of your group of four will remain unaltered. 
For 10 periods you will therefore be in the same group. Please note that the identification 
number assigned to you and the other members of the group changes randomly in each period. 
Group members can therefore not be identified as the periods progress.  
In each period, the experiment consists of 3 steps. In Step 1, you have to decide how many taler 
you wish to contribute to a project. In Step 2, you are told how much all other players contribut-
ed to the project and can decide, by giving points, on whether and by how much the other group 
members’ income from Step 1 should be increased or reduced.  In Step 3, those players whose 
income was reduced in Step 2 can, in turn, reduce the income of the same players who did this to 
them.  
The following pages outline the exact procedure of the experiment.  
Information on the exact procedure of the experiment 31 
Step 1 
At the beginning of each period, each participant is allotted 20 taler, which we shall henceforth 
refer to as his endowment. The player’s job is now to make a decision with regard to using his 
endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 taler you wish to pay into a project and 
how many you wish to keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in 
greater detail below.  
Your endowment is, thus, 20 taler in each period. You make a decision on your project contri-
bution by typing any one whole number between 0 and 20 into the appropriate field on your 
screen. This field can be accessed using the mouse. As soon as you have determined your contri-
bution, you have also decided on how many taler to keep for yourself, i.e., 20 – your contribu-
tion. Once you have typed in your contribution, please click on Continue, again using the 
mouse. Once you have done this, your decision for this period is irreversible.  
Once all members of the group have made their decisions, you will be told how high the total 
sum of contributions from all group members (including your own) to the project is. In addition, 
you are informed about your own contribution and the number of taler kept by you; you are also 
told how many taler you have earned in total during Step 1. 
Your income therefore consists of two parts, namely: 
(1)  the taler you have kept for yourself ("income from taler retained") and  
(2) the  "income gained from the project". Your income from the project is .4 times the 
total sum of all contributions to the project. 
Your total income from Step 1 is therefore calculated as follows:  
Total taler income at the end of Step 1  
 = income from taler retained + income from the project 
Income from the project = 0,4 × Total sum of all contributions to the project  
The total income at the end of Step 1, in taler, is calculated according to the same formula for 
each member of the group.  
If, for example, the sum of the contributions from all group members adds up to 60 taler, you and 
all other members each receive a project income of .4x 60 = 24 taler. If the group members have 
contributed a total of 9 taler to the project, you and all other members each receive an income of 
.4x9 = 3.6 taler from the project.  
For each taler you keep for yourself, you earn an income of 1 taler. If, on the other hand, you 
contribute one taler from your endowment to your group’s project instead, the sum of the contri-
butions to the project increases by one taler and your income from the project increases by .4x1 32 
= .4 taler. However, the income of each individual group member also increases by .4 taler, so 
that the group’s total income increases by .4x4 = 1.6 taler. The other group members thereby also 
profit from your contributions from the project. In turn, you profit from other members’ contri-
butions to the project. For each taler contributed to the project by another group member, you 
earn .4x1 = .4 taler.  
When you have finished, please click on Continue, using the mouse. Step 1 is now over and 
Step 2 about to begin.   
Step 2 
In Step 2, you will be told how many other group members have contributed to the project. In 
addition, you can decrease, or leave as it is, the income of each individual group member by 
giving points. All other group members are allowed to decrease their income, too, if they so 
wish. 
In order to do this, you will be shown on your screen how many taler each individual group 
member has contributed to the project; in other words, you are told the identification number, for 
the current period, of each group member, as well as their contributions.  
You now have to decide for every group member (excluding yourself) how many points you 
wish to give them. It is compulsory to enter a figure at this stage. If you do not wish to alter a 
certain group member’s income, please insert 0. You can operate within the fields underneath the 
line "Points" by using the tab key (→|) or the mouse. 
 
When distributing points, you incur costs in taler which depend on the number of points you dis-
tribute to the individual players. Distributed points are numbers between 0 and 10. The more 33 
points you give an individual player, the higher your costs are. The total costs in taler are calcu-
lated as the sum of the costs of all points distributed to all other group members. The following 
table shows the connection between the points distributed to an individual group member and the 
costs of such distribution in taler:  
Table 1: Costs of the distribution of points to one other group member in Step 2 
 
Points given to a group 
member
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cost of these points in ta-
ler 
0 1 2 4 6 9 12  16  20  25  30 
 
Your total cost of the points distribution is the sum of all costs to all three other group members. 
For example, if you have allocated 2 points to one member, your cost is 2 taler; if, in addition, 
you give 9 points to another group member, your cost is 25 taler; if you give the final group 
member 0 points, you have no costs. The total cost to you is therefore 27 taler (2+25+0). As 
long as you have not yet clicked on Continue, you may still change your decision.  
If you choose 0 points for a certain group member, you do not alter this group member’s income. 
With each point allocated to a group member, you decrease this particular group member’s taler 
income from Step 1 by 10 per cent. Thus, if you allocate 2 points to a group member, for in-
stance, thereby choosing 2, you decrease his income by 20 per cent. The points allocated by you 
therefore determine how significantly one group member’s taler income from Step 1 is reduced.  
Whether, or by how much, a group member’s income from Step 1 is reduced overall depends on 
the total number of points received. If, for instance, one member receives a total of 3 points 
from all other members, the income in Step 1 is reduced by 30 per cent. If a member receives a 
total of 4 points, the income in Step 1 is reduced by 40 per cent. If a member receives exactly 
10 points or more, the income in Step 1 is reduced by 100 per cent. The income in Step 1, in this 
case, would be reduced to Zero for this member. Your total income from the first two steps, in 
taler, is thus calculated as follows:  
Total taler income at the end of Step 2:  
 = (Total taler income after Step 1) × (10 – points received)/10  
– cost of points distributed by you  
if points received < 10 
= – cost of points distributed by you 
if points received ≥ 10 34 
Step 3 
 
In the third and final step, you are told how many points each individual group member has giv-
en you. If group members have given you points in Step 2, you can now reduce the income 
of these group members by allocating what is known as “counter-points“. Only those group 
members who received points in Step 2 are allowed to allocate counter-points. And these coun-
ter-points can only be distributed to group members who gave them points in Step 2.  
A counter-point reduces the income that remained in the possession of the member in question 
at the end of Step 2 by 25 %. Should a member receive exactly 4 or more counter-points, the 
income from Step 2 is reduced by 100%. If you yourself receive 4 or more counter-points from 
group members to whom you gave points in the previous step, your own income from Step 2 is 
therefore also reduced by 100%.  
The costs of counter-points are calculated just as in Step 2. Note, however, that if you give one-
group member counter-points in addition to having given him points, then the costs are calculated 
according to the sum of all the points this group member has received from you in Steps 2 and 3.  
The costs of the counter-points can be seen in Table 2. Example: If you give Player 1 a total of 2 
points in Step 2, your cost in Step 2 is 2 taler. If you give Player 1 a total of 3 further points in 
Step 3, a further 7 taler are added to your cost.  
Table 2: Costs of the distribution of Counter-points to one other group member in Step 3 
 
Points you have already giv-
en to the group member in 
Step 2 
 
Counter-points given to the group member in Step 3 
 Gruppenmitglied in Stufe 3 
0 1 2 3 4 
0  0 1 2 4 6 
1  0 1 3 5 8 
2  0 2 4 7 10 
3  0 2 5 8 12 
4  0 3 6 10  14 
5  0 3 7 11  16 
6  0 4 8 13  18 
7  0 4 9 14   
8  0 5 10     
9  0 5      
10  0      
 
On your screen, you can see how many points each individual group member has given to you in 
Step 2. Now you must decide, for each of these group members, how many counter-points you 
wish to give this member. It is compulsory to enter a figure at this stage. If you do not wish to 
alter a certain group member’s income, please insert 0.  
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Your total income from all three steps, in taler, is thus calculated as follows:  
Total taler income at the end of Step 3 = Period Income 
 = (Total taler income after Step 2) × (4 – counter-points received)/4  
– cost of counter-points distributed by you  
if the sum of the counter-points received is < 4 
= – cost of counter-points distributed by you 
if the sum of the counter-points received is ≥ 4 












Your total income, in taler, is calculated from the sum of your taler income in each period, in 
addition to the flat payment of 25 taler given to you at the beginning. As mentioned above, you 
receive 4 euro cent for each taler. You are also paid 4 Euro for showing up.  
Do you have any further questions? 
 
  
 